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Assessing Contingent Convertible Bonds for Bank
Recapitalization in Nigeria
Kabir Katata1
This study estimates the parameters of credit derivatives, equity derivatives
and structural models for bank recapitalisation in Nigeria by employing contingent convertibles (CoCos) and using the Nigeria Treasury Bill rate for
2009 as the risk-free rate, estimated recapitalisation requirements for the
banks as at 2009 and relevant banks’ share prices for 2008 and 2009. The
study finds the structural approach as the preferred model for CoCo pricing, as it reported the least pricing errors and also builds asset values of the
banks from publicly-available quoted stock prices as well as deposit components of bank’s balance sheet information. The study also finds that CoCo
bonds are likely to be fully subscribed when issued given the high stock price
volatility coupled with high credit spreads in Nigeria. The paper suggests that
CoCos could have been issued by the banks to recapitalise themselves without the need for regulatory actions. Therefore, usage of CoCos by banks
can reduce the possibility of a bailout with public funds and lessen regulatory actions, if properly implemented, to boost the troubled banks’ capital.
Keywords: Contingent convertible bond, bond pricing, structural model, equity
derivatives, credit derivatives.
JEL Classification: C52; C58; G13; G21; G28; G32; G33
DOI: 10.33429/Cjas.10119.6/6

1.0 Introduction
Contingent convertible (CoCos) bonds or CoCos have been proposed as potential
mechanisms for bank recapitalisation so as to enhance financial stability (Avdjiev
et al. 2017). CoCos are fixed income instruments that can be transformed into
equity when a bank’s capital is below some predefined level or when a trigger is
breached (Chen et al. 2013). Both CoCos (a nonresolution/going-concern tool)
and bail-in (a resolution/gone-concern situation tool) can boost a failing bank’s
capital through the conversion of bonds to equity so that the holders of such in1
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struments bear the recapitalisation burden (Bundesbank, 2018). CoCo exists as
an accessible and an existing capital to banks during crises because, a bank will
have difficulty raising new equity. They are therefore, ideal capital instruments
that fulfil new statutory requirements as going-concern instruments. According
to Avdjiev et al. (2013), they need to possess the following three characteristics
in order to achieve that objective. First, there is a need for CoCos to readily act
as cushion against losses before or when a bank becomes insolvent. Second, the
ability to withstand losses has to be based on the capital base of the bank that will
issue the bond. Finally, CoCos should be designed so as to withstand attempts to
influence their prices and other undesired speculative activities.

As a new type of bank capital, CoCos have provided a very convenient means of
resolving the issues that worry policy makers on strengthening a bank’s balance
sheet where public funds cannot be used. The Capital Requirements Directive 4
(CRD4) proposal has specified the conditions for CoCos to be suitable as additional
Tier 1 Capital. Basel III and the Independent Commission on Banking-Vickers
(ICB-Vickers) report have all supported the use of CoCos as contingent capital
structures (Boermans and van Wijnbergen, 2018). Flannery (2014) propose the
inclusion of considerable CoCos to replace some equity used to satisfy statutory
capital adequacy ratios. In addition to Basel III, CRD4 and the ICB-Vickers regulations, other regulators that supported bank capital recapitalisation using CoCos
without public funds include the European Banking Authority (2011) and the
Swiss Commission of Experts (2010).

CoCos are also recognised by financial institutions, in addition to academics and
regulators, as efficient means to enforce countercyclical regulation. Banks prefer
CoCos to equity for several reasons (Pazarbasioglu et al., 2011). First, the issuance
of CoCos does not alter corporate control because they do not necessarily dilute
the source of capital for current shareholders. Second, they can be cheaper if the
interest expense is tax deductible. Third, CoCos can be used as Pillar 2 capital
in supervisory stress tests. Specifically, CoCos provide a means of achieving the
requirements of Basel III such that the CoCos will convert into equity in when the
bank is experiencing difficult and needs more capital. Fourth, they can enhance
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the liquidity of the bank during periods of stress. Fifth, CoCos give incentives to
the bank shareholders and management to enhance the bank’s risk management
for fear of CoCos being triggered.

Despite the global appeal, CoCos were not considered as a better alternative to
bailout in resolving the crisis that rocked Nigeria financial system during the 2007
to 2009 global financial crisis. The cost of bailout of the 2007-09 crisis was more
than US$8.5 trillion (Alessandri and Haldane, 2011). Major banks around the
world were rescued from the crisis with funds of over US$1 trillion. The Nigerian
financial system was not spared as the 2008 banking crisis led to capital injection
of N620 billion into 10 banks by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), in the form
of a subordinated loan (Sanusi, 2010; Sanusi, 2012a). Furthermore, N4.7 trillion of
public funds was used by Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON),
as at 2011, to purchase toxic bank assets and recapitalize banks (Sanusi, 2012b)2 .
Effectively, the 2007-09 global financial crisis as well as the 2008 Nigerian banking
crisis were resolved or bailed-out using public funds. CoCos are new to the Nigerian financial system and perhaps coupled with their pricing complexity, have had
limited applicability in the context of the domestic banking sector.

The main contributions of this study are three-fold. First, the understanding of
CoCos could greatly enhance the toolkit for resolving banks without recourse to
public funds in Nigeria. The main issue of the recapitalization is how to price
the CoCos by deciding on the main parameters required to issue them. Recapitalization comes only after the decision of pricing and structuring of the CoCos
is made. The paper therefore designs CoCos for three banks by deciding on the
2

In Nigeria, bank failure resolution is the responsibility of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance
Corporation (NDIC) and CBN based on the powers accorded the two institutions by
the BOFIA 1991 as amended, CBN Act 2007 and NDIC Act 2006. These Acts granted
power to the NDIC to carry out the following resolution options: Open Bank Assistance;
Depositor Reimbursement; Purchase and Assumption; Bridge Bank Mechanism; Assisted
Mergers and Purchase of Assets (NDIC, 2009 & NDIC, 2013). The BOFIA Act enables
CBN to perform Open Bank Assistance, act as the Lender of last resort or transfer a
bank to NDIC for recapitalisation or any other resolution measures. AMCON, through its
Act, has been empowered to Purchase NPLs and recapitalize distressed banks while the
Ministry of Finance is the Guarantor of the CBN, therefore the Guarantor of the Lender
of Last Resort.
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main required parameters that include the conversion rate, appropriate trigger
type & level and the yield of the bond. These three Nigerian banks were initially
resolved in 2011 using the bridge-bank mechanism. By using the CoCo recapitalisation, bank failure resolution using public funds could be effectively avoided
in Nigeria. Second, this paper contributes to the literature of CoCos structuring
by employing the credit and equity derivatives as well as structural methods to
estimate key parameters required for CoCo pricing in Nigeria. Through the evaluation of the three CoCo pricing models empirically, the paper has extended the
literature towards a common or generally accepted modelling for practitioners and
academics. These methods are then evaluated based on their applicability and
underlying assumptions. Third, specific policy implications for the Nigerian financial system regulators are provided to derive a bank failure resolution using CoCos.

The rest of this paper is categorised into six sections. Section 2 reviews relevant
literature covering both theoretical and empirical concepts including the structure
and pricing of CoCos. Section 3 discusses some CoCo issuances and CoCo market share while section 4 presents the methodology used for the study. Section
5 presents the data used for the study, implements the chosen CoCo modelling
methodologies, discusses the results and their sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.

2.0 Literature Review
A convertible bond is a bond which can be transformed to a fixed quantity of
shares of stocks of the company that issued the bond or equivalent value of cash
(De Spiegeleer et al. 2014). There are different types of convertible bonds. A
CoCo, the focus of this paper, is a convertible bond that readily changes from a
bond into common stock when some pre-set trigger is activated at an agreed ratio
before the expiration of the bond. It should also be noted that CoCos are different
from conventional convertible bonds because they possess features of both bonds
and equity. Another difference between CoCos and traditional convertible debentures is that in the latter, the conversion is triggered by the bondholder, while in
the former, it is triggered automatically without any delay once the stated condi-
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tions are fulfilled (Bundesbank, 2018).
It is worthy of note that there is no single generally accepted standard methodology for structuring CoCos (Avdjiev et al. 2013). Rather, the choice of the features
and parameters of the CoCo should be based on the bank‘s condition. It is therefore vital to understand what constitutes CoCos before they can be structured. In
the literature review, the paper presents the theory of structuring CoCos, reviews
some selected pricing models and briefly reviews the empirical literature.

2.1 Theoretical Premise for Structuring CoCos
De Spiegeleer et al. (2014) and Calomiris and Herring (2011) discuss the structure
of a CoCos that comprises three main constituents: the predefined level or trigger
which when breached the CoCo is converted to equity so that the bank’s capital
is increased, the ability to absorb losses, and the underlying host instrument.

2.1.1 The Trigger Event
The choice of the type and feature of trigger is very essential in structuring CoCos.
A suitable trigger has to be correctly structured, converted or issued at the right
time with detailed valuation of the bank issuing the CoCo (Calomiris and Herring,
2011). Triggers can be either mechanical or discretionary. The mechanical trigger
contains a trigger variable with an associated level. The variable can be based on
a particular bank or systemically-defined across the whole industry. In the case of
the discretionary trigger, the regulator decides when to convert, write down and
any other critical decision required to price the CoCo.
According to De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2011a), the 6 essential criteria for an
optimal trigger event are objective, fixed, clarity, public transparent, stable and
regularly updated. The clarity condition ensures that the bond has the same meaning in all countries CoCo is traded while the objective condition makes sure that
the process of conversion to equity is well understood at the date of issue and is
detailed in the prospectus. The remaining four conditions ensure that the trigger
is stable and does not change arbitrarily (the fixed condition), clear for all that
are interested (the public) and updated continuously (regularity) so that investors
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can evaluate the CoCo’s parameters at all times (transparency).

A CoCo can have a single or several triggers. Common single triggers include
market measures like stock price, accounting ones such as Core Tier 1 ratio or
regulatory where the decision of when conversion takes place resides with the supervisory body according to assessment of the bank’s solvency status.

For accounting triggers, the CoCo is converted whenever an accounting ratio, like
the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) common equity ratios or leverage ratios, falls
below a specified threshold. The trigger is market-based when the CoCo is written
down or converted as a result of the share price of the issuing bank falling below
some prescribed level, usually set less the share price at issuance. Accounting-value
triggers have the limitations of being lagging indicators of the bank’s balance sheet
because they are not considered to be forward-looking and are only available at low
frequencies like monthly or quarterly basis instead of hourly or daily occurrences
(Flannery, 2002). In this case, CoCo investors can possibly stay uneducated about
key information like the trigger level for long time periods. Also, Flannery (2002)
and Skinner & Ioannides (2011) argue that accounting triggers could be erratic or
inaccurate as accounting variables can be influenced by the banks and sometimes
produce imprecise estimates. For example, accounting ratios produced high CET1
ratios before the 2007 financial crisis which were later found to be incorrect.

An ideal and simple representative of market trigger is the stock price of a bank.
The lowest rate of the market value trigger is obtained as the fraction of the stock
market capitalisation of the bank to its assets (Sundaresan and Wang, 2011).
Market trigger is available at high frequencies like hourly and daily and are considered to be forward-looking. However, difficulty of pricing and possibility of the
share price being manipulated by market players are some disadvantages of the
market-value trigger (Avdjiev et al. 2013). The academia prefers market-value to
accounting triggers because they satisfy all the outlined properties (De Spiegeleer
and Schoutens, 2011a). This could therefore reduce balance sheet manipulation
and the need for regulatory intervention or forbearance, as the case may be.
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Bank supervisors decide when regulatory trigger (also called non-viability trigger)
can be activated based on the strength of the issuing bank’s balance sheet. Using
this trigger, bank supervisors have the power to trigger a CoCo so as to prevent the
issuing bank’s insolvency or further decline its existence. It is challenging to price
CoCos using regulatory trigger because when conversion should take place cannot
be easily determined in a transparent manner but at the choice of the regulator
(Nordal and Stefano, 2014). Furthermore, Nordal and Stefano (2014) state that
regulatory forbearance, where regulators may wait longer than necessary before
triggering conversion supports not using the regulatory triggers.
Some regulators like the Swiss Commission of Experts (2010) prefer either the nonviability or accounting to market triggers. This may be supported by the possibilities of profitable stock price manipulation (Flannery, 2009). However, Bloomberg
(2009) argue that a CoCo with a single accounting trigger can be effortlessly manipulated; it is also neither transparent, public nor frequently updated. According
to MacDonald (2010) and Rudlinger (2015) given that stock prices are much more
regularly updated and more objective than accounting ratios, they could be less
susceptible to manipulation.
Multi-variate trigger, another type of trigger, accomplishes the switch of the CoCo
into stocks by relying on more than a single trigger stipulation (De Spiegeleer and
Schoutens, 2011b). For the multi-variate triggers, both the banking system and
individual bank measures are considered as enhancement to only individual triggers
like a single accounting trigger (MacDonald, 2010). When a CoCo possesses more
than one trigger, then the ability to absorb losses becomes active when any of the
triggers is breached. Once the capital of a bank falls lower than a certain level as
a percentage of its risk-weighted assets, then the accounting trigger is activated
(Avdjiev et al. 2013). In some cases, the bank or the supervisors’ of the firm
can set the trigger at their discretion. The recapitalization of banks with solvency
problems using the multi-variate trigger is possible when the banking system is
either stable or in crisis.
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2.1.2 The Loss-Absorption Mechanism
It is the next main feature of every CoCo after the trigger event. The lossabsorption mechanism deals with transforming debt to equity or non-reversible
principal write-down so that the issuing bank’s equity can be enhanced (Flannery,
2009)3 . In the first case, the CET1 of a CoCo is boosted because the debt is
converted to equity CoCo at some conversion rate that has been pre-defined. In
such a case, the loss absorption mechanism can be tied to the stock price of the
bank when the trigger is breached; a pre-stated price that is usually the stock price
when it is issued. It can also be a mixture of the two.
The write-down of a CoCo’s principal could be either full or partial. The most
common write-down among CoCos is the full one. The conversion ratio Cr is defined as the number of shares that one gets for each converted bond. Given the face
value N , the conversion price Cp can be defined as the price that the underlying
shares can be purchased when the trigger event occurs.

2.1.3 The Host Instruments
This is the underlying contract into which the CoCo was embedded such as junior
bond, senior debt or a perpetual preferred security. The host instrument could
therefore be debt or a convertible bond. As described by Stamicar (2016), CoCos are eligible as either Additional Tier 1 (AT1) or Tier 2 (T2) capital in Basel
III. T2 capital is a gone-concern capital because it enables loss-absorption while
liquidating a bank. It is also lower in seniority to senior debt and deposits but
higher than T1 capital (Stamicar, 2016). For CoCos to meet the requirements of
AT1 capital, they must absorb losses and prevent insolvency as a going-concern
contingent capital.

2.1.4 Pricing Contingent Convertible Bonds
The combined features of both equity and fixed-income present in CoCos make
their pricing challenging. According to Erismann (2015) and Stamicar (2016),
CoCo pricing can be divided into three categories: credit derivatives or reduced
form approach, equity derivatives model and structural approach.
3

For further details, see De Spiegeleer et al. (2014) and McDonald (2010).
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In the credit derivatives approach, CoCos are regarded as bonds that can default
while cash is the final payoff (see De Spiegeleer and Schoutens, 2011a; Duffie and
Singleton, 2003). For the equity derivatives approach, the pricing of CoCos involves
looking for solutions of a portfolio that reproduces the final payoff which is viewed
as long position in share prices that are knocked in once a trigger is breached.
CoCos can be priced using barrier options in this approach (see Rüdlinger, 2015;
De Spiegeleer and Schoutens, 2011a).
The structural approach posits that once a firm’s asset value falls below its liabilities, the firm can be considered to have defaulted. Using the specified stochastic
process for the assets and liabilities, the structural approach estimates the probability of default of the firm. This approach was used to price CoCos by Albul et
al. (2010), Chen et al. (2013), Krishnan and Jacoby (2012), Pennacchi (2010), De
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011a) and Glasserman & Nouri (2012).

2.2 Empirical Literature
Wilkens and Bethke (2014) carry out an empirical review of CoCo pricing models focussing on their appropriateness for specific scenarios and instruments. The
study of CoCos issued by major banks showed that the 3 pricing approaches were
found to be ideal for CoCos bond prices that have been offered. However, the study
reveal that the equity derivatives model is the most appropriate for structuring
CoCos as well as managing the associated risks in practice due to its simplistic parameterisation and interpretation. They also find that although the equity
derivative model was the worst performing model in assessment of model fit, it
accomplishes the best performance in their hedge assessment. The study suggest
further empirical study due to the relative short period of CoCos offered as well
as the data used for the analysis.
Erismann (2015) study CoCo pricing using four models: the structural approach,
credit derivative and equity derivative approaches and a credit default swap4 model
4

A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial derivative or contract that allows an investor
to offset his or her credit risk with that of another investor. In this contract, one party
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devised by the investment bank J.P. Morgan. It was found that for model complexity, the credit derivative model has the least while the equity derivative model
the highest, whereas the structural approach suffers from data assembly and parameterization. It was also found that all the models overestimated the risks in
CoCos in comparison to what has been observed in practice and that the structural
model reported the least pricing errors and therefore preferred.
Liebenberg et al., (2018) propose Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertible (COERC), a variation of CoCo for African banks. COERC are bonds that transform
to equity when the bank’s share of capital drops lower than a certain level. One of
the main reasons for choosing COERCs is because issues associated with marketbased triggers due to influence and panic can be avoided by banks in using them.
The study supports using CoCos to encourage counter cyclicality for banks’ capital structure. However, for the African market, the study suggested modifications
to the COERC structure like altering the coupon payment mechanism of the COERCs issued by banks in Africa so that they stop paying coupon to investors, or
decrease the amount coupon payments.
A study by Avdjiev et al. (2017) find that CoCos with mechanical triggers and
Additional Tier 1 (AT1) designation as well as those that convert to equity led
to reduced bank fragility through lowering of its credit risk. They also note that
CoCos that possess only regulatory triggers do not seem to have any impact on the
bank’s credit risk and except for those with principal write-down and high trigger
value, CoCos don’t seem to have any statistically significant impact on share prices.
In a review of CoCos issued by European banks between January 2009 to June
2014, Nordal and Stefano (2014) note that 37 banks had accounting triggers based
on capital adequacy ratios, the range of the trigger levels was between 2% and
8.25% out of which majority of these issues (59%) have a trigger in the range of
makes payments to the other and receives in return the promise of compensation if a third
party defaults. It may involve municipal bonds, emerging market bonds, mortgage-backed
securities or corporate bonds. The credit default swap model prices CoCos using the CDS
arguments where the value of the CDS to a buyer is going to be the risk neutral value of
the protection minus the risk neutral value of the premiums.
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5%-5.25% and 5.125% are more common than 5% trigger. The 5.125% trigger
are possibly due to Basel III requirements of additional Tier 1-qualifying capital
having a trigger not less than 5.125%. The study state that market-based trigger
through equity conversion, as used in the first CoCo issued by Lloyds, though still
used to structuring CoCos, has lost traction and less used than accounting-based
ones.

3.0 Some CoCo Issuances and CoCo Market Share
This section summarizes global CoCo issuances, market share and potentials.
CoCo bonds were initially issued mainly in Europe (Bundesbank, 2018) that could
be because, as previously stated, CoCos have qualified as regulatory capital in
Basel III since 2013. CoCos of 9.6 billion euro was first issued in 2009 by Lloyds
bank followed by Intesa Sanpaolo, Rabobank, Unicredit and Yorkshire Building
Society in 2010 whose total face value was 2.9 billion euro (Nordal and Stefano,
2014).
Table 1 provides some key details of the earliest CoCo issuances. From the table,
Lloyds had the largest issuance size, followed by Barclays, then Credit Suisse with
the least issued by Rabobank. All the CoCos issued had 10 year maturity except
Lloyds with 10-20 years while Credit Suisse had 30 years. It should be noted that
the Trigger is 7% CET1 or 7% Equity/Risk-Weighted Assets (based on Basel III)
for the banks, except Lloyds that is based on 5% Core Tier1. It is worthy of note
that not only Global-Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) offer CoCos as shown
in the table. Rabobank is not a GSIB and was one of the early issuers of CoCos.
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Table 1: Description of some of the early CoCos

Source: De Spiegeleer et al. (2014)

Nordal and Stefano (2014) review CoCos issued by European banks from January
2009 to June 2014. They note that 37 banks from twelve countries issued CoCos with total face value volume of approximately 74 billion euro via 102 issues.
They further note that most of the 11 large issuers (73%) were classified by the
Financial Stability Board as Global-Systemically Important Banks. It was also
stated that G-SIB issuers hold a notable 58% share of the global CoCo market.
Up to the review period, the authors further state that on bank-by-bank basis, the
biggest issuance of outstanding CoCos were by Lloyds and Credit Suisse with 14%
and 12% share of the European market, respectively. The third place was jointly
occupied by Barclays and UBS with 11% of the market share. Considering the
two big Swiss banks, Nordal and Stefano (2014) state that Credit Suisse and UBS
have issued CoCos totalling 23% of all CoCos issued by European banks. In terms
of currency, it was reported that the issuances in the CoCo market were mainly
through Euros and US Dollars.
By the end of 2017, 398 CoCo bonds were issued in Europe with a total volume
of 230 billion euro with the UK banks having the largest issuances, then Swiss,
French and finally Spanish banks (Bundesbank, 2018). In the same German central
bank report, the regulator state that out of these European CoCo bonds issuances,
European Union had 285 with a total volume of 193 billion euro out of the 230
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billion euro5 . The central bank also note that European CoCo bonds were then
mostly in the hands of investors outside Europe, then held by mutual funds found
in Ireland and Luxembourg.

Furthermore, capital was raised through CoCos issuance by 64 European banks
which were mostly British and Swiss (Boermans and van Wijnbergen, 2018). They
also note that European banks issued three times the total amount of CoCos
against those from 2012 to 2015 that achieved a record value of 157 billion euro.
According to them, banks’ desire to structure CoCos was burgeoning in Europe due
to the proliferation of new rules and regulations as a result of the 2007-09 financial
crisis. For instance, banks have to respond to the European implementation of the
Basel III Accord, the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the
European Banking Authority requirements of the liquidity coverage ratio for banks.

Avdjiev et al. (2017) report that global data as at 2015, by Bank for International
Settlements, showed that CoCo bonds valued at 522 billion euro was from 731
issues, out of which 39% were conducted by European banks. $713 million was the
average CoCo issued and the value of the issues was in the range of $2 million to
$7 billion. The authors further note that 39% of the issuances can be credited to
the European market followed by banks from non-European advanced economies
with 14% while emerging market economies had over 46% of the CoCo market
by the end of 2015. The early part of the sample, according to Avdjiev et al.
(2017), was mainly located in advanced European countries especially the UK and
Switzerland, while the last part of the sample contains issuances by non-European
advanced economies like Australia, Japan, and Canada, which steadily picked due
to the implementation of Basel III. CoCo issuance by banks in Emerging Market
economies was moderately low until the last years of the sample, when Chinese
banks became active issuers of CoCos. However, a prominent non-appearance from
5

Note that Europe and European Union are distinct entities according to the German central bank report. It should be noted that Europe is a continent that has 45
states/countries while European Union is a political and economic association of some
countries in Europe, comprising of 27 countries. The term ”Europe” cannot interchangeably refer to European Union because not all the countries of Europe are part of the
European Union (e.g Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, etc.)
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register of CoCo-issuing countries is the United States.
Avdjiev et al. (2017) also describe CoCo issuances according to currencies. The authors state that banks usually issue CoCos either in their individual home currencies or in US dollars. Almost all CoCos issued in Australian dollars, British pounds,
Canadian dollars, Chinese yuan and Japanese yen were issued by banks from the
corresponding currency-issuing countries. It was also stated by the authors that
euro area banks issued about two thirds of the $84 billion in euro-denominated
CoCos. It was further noted that 28% of global issuance, $148 billion worth of
CoCos, was US dollar-denominated.
Boermans et al. (2014) state that over 20 European banks had issued more than
100 CoCos within 2012 to 2014. The majority of CoCos, according to the authors,
were issued by British and Swiss banks, while in 2013, Danish, German, French,
Italian and Spanish banks have all issued CoCos to raise capital. Boermans et al.
(2014) further report that the total volume of CoCo issuances reached its highest
level of 28 billion euro in the first six months of 2014. The reason given for the
rising CoCo issuances in Europe, according to the authors, include the search for
yield and investors’ readiness to take extra risks where the effective yield on CoCos
was 8.3% at end-2013 against 6% on other high-yield bonds and the new set of
rules and regulations on capital requirements for banks like Basel III Accord and
the European Capital Requirements Regulation that allowed CoCos to be used
as an additional bank capital. Other reasons given by the authors include the
fact that European banks issued CoCos to enhance their capital base towards the
comprehensive assessment carried out by European Central Bank and that CoCos
are less restrictive than new shares. For instance, CoCos do not result in capital
dilution for existing shareholders.

4.0 Methodology
4.1 CoCo Modelling using Structural Model
The structural approach, introduced by Merton (1974), was based on the BlackScholes option pricing framework and it involves modelling the assets on a bank’s
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balance sheet using a suitable stochastic process. It should be noted that, this
approach considers the total value of the bank’s assets to be equal to the sum of
its capital instruments. Therefore, the value of the bank’s assets should be equal
to the sum of the bank’s deposits, CoCos, senior bonds and book value of equity
(De Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2011a and Glasserman & Nouri, 2012).
The structural models explicitly capture the trigger event, the credit derivatives
models view CoCos as carrying credit risk as an integral feature like conversion
through the trigger while equity derivative models regard the stock price as representing the bank’s financial condition.
In the classical structural Merton credit risk model, the value of any firm is based
on the Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) given in (1). Let the total value of a
bank be V , its continuously compounded return on V given as µ. Also, let the
volatility of the bank’s assets be σv while dW is a standard Wiener process.
The GBM describes the random behaviour of the asset price level Vt over time
dV = µV dt + σv V dW

(1)

The Merton model considers a bank that has issued a bond that will expire at
time T and the bank’s activities are funded with equity ET . Therefore, the value
of equity is the price of a European call option on the bank’s assets (A) minus its
net liabilities (D). The call option is priced by the Black-Scholes-Merton formula.
This is specified in (3).
ET = max(AT − D, 0)

(2)

However, according to the put-call parity, the bank’s value of its debt is equivalent
to the value of a risk-free discount bond with put option value subtracted. The
Merton model defines the bank’ equity value as
ET = AEN (d1 ) − e−rT DN (d2 )

(3)

According to (3), E is the bank’s equity market value, the risk-free rate is r while
the cumulative standard normal distribution function is N (·). d1 and d2 can be
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specified as
d1 =
where

ln(AT/D) + (r + 0.5σv2 )T
√
σv T

(4)

√
d2 = d1 − σv T

(5)

From Ito’s Lemma,

σE =

V
T



δE
σv
δV

(6)

From the Black-Scholes model we obtain that N (d1 ) = δE/δV and
 
V
N (d1 )σv
σE =
E

(7)

The probability of default is the probability that the call option is not exercised
as given in (8)
P oD = N

ln(AT/D) + (r − 0.5σv2 )T
√
σv T

!
(8)

Distance-to-default (DD) measures the number of standard deviations the expected
asset value is away from the default. Therefore, a high DD value implies a low
default probability. A low or 0.0DD or even negative means that the bank is
extremely likely to fail unless the asset value improves. DD is related to Probability
of Default (PoD) and given as
P oD = N (−DD)

(8b)

Derivation of Implied Credit Spread from the Merton Model
A credit spread refers to the difference in yield of two bonds of the same maturity
but with dissimilar credit rating. For existing risk-free rate and the market value
of today’s debt B0 , then:
B0 = A0 − E0

(9)

Recall from (3) that ET = AEN (d1 ) − e−rT DN (d2 ). Therefore,
B0 = A0 [N (d1 ) − LN (d2 )]
Leverage, L, can be obtained from (6) and (7) as
 −rT 
De
L=
A0
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Let y be the yield to maturity, then s, the implied credit spread of the BlackScholes model can be solved as
h
s = ln N (d2 ) −

N (−d1 )
L

i
T f rom y − r = s

(12)

4.2 CoCo Modelling using Credit Derivatives
In a reduced-form approach, default probability is stochastic, described by a Poisson process and is controlled by a hazard function λ. For time short time t, λdt is
the default probability by a bank that issues a bond whose default occurs within
time interval [t, t + dt]. Pserv is the probability that the bond survives between
time t and T and is given as exp(−λ(T − t)). Similarly, the default probability,
Pdef , is the default probability of the bond from time t to T and is given as
1 − exp(−λ(T − t)), with T as Maturity. The equations in this section are given
in De Spiegeleer et al. (2014).
When there is a default, the bond investors are expected to recover some portion
of the face value N of the bond. The recovery rate in this case is denoted as π
while the loss the investor suffers is calculated as (1 − π)N . However, credit spread
is traditionally used by investors to include default risk of a bond. Therefore, the
credit spread CS and default intensity (hazard function) λ of a bond are related
by the following equation
CS = (1 − π)λ

(13)

Equation 13 is a very important equation that links together credit spread, credit
spread and recovery rate. This equation enables modelling the trigger event of a
CoCo that converts into shares similar to default in corporate debt as an extreme
event, which is used in modelling hitting the CoCo trigger.
The probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD) are related to
the credit spread according to Allen et al. (2009) by the following equation:
CS = P D × LGD

(14)

It is well-known that expected returns of a risky asset give the equivalent of the
return of a risk free rate in the absence of arbitrage. Therefore, a risky debt’s
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observed yield can be broken down into the sum of a risk-free rate and a premium
on risk.
For CoCo or contingent debt, the default intensity λ given in (13) is substituted
with a CoCo trigger intensity λT rigger while πco is the CoCo recovery rate. We can
therefore obtain the value of the credit spread on CoCo or contingent debt using
the following credit triangle:
CSco = (1 − πco )λT rigger

(15)

It should be noted that the loss suffered by the CoCo can be pre-specified for
CoCos that possess a write-down mechanism. πco = 0 for a full write-down on a
CoCo. However, for CoCo with a conversion in shares, the losses will be based on
the level of the share price S∗, usually unknown, when the trigger is hit.
Recall πco is known as the recovery rate for a particular CoCo bond. The loss for
the Coco,Loco , is given as:
N (1 − πco )

(16)

Recall S ∗ is the trigger Stock price and Pc is the conversion price per share, then
the recovery rate when the CoCo is triggered is the ratio of trigger stock price and
the conversion price, that is πco = S ∗ /Pc . Therefore, CoCo credit spread can also
be written as
CSco = (1 −

S∗
)λT rigger
Pc

(17)

Obviously, there is no loss suffered on the investment if both the conversion price
and the share price observed at the moment of the trigger are equal.
Recall Pdef = 1 − exp(−λT rigger (T − t)), therefore
CSco =

1
S∗
log(1 − Pdef (1 −
))
T −t
Pc

(18)

Let φ(x) be the probability that a random variable X, that follows a standard
normal distribution and takes a value smaller than x. Let σ be volatility, S the
current share price and P ∗ the probability of hitting the trigger during the life of
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the CoCo and is given as
∗

P =

log

s∗
s



− µ (T − t)

!

σ (T − t)(0.5)

where µ = r − q −

σ2
2 ,

σ

s

φ

log

s∗
s



+ µ (T − t)

σ (T − t)(0.5)

!
(19)

r = risk free interest rate, continuously compounded

and q=continuous dividend yield.
− log(1 −

+

 s∗  2µ2

Therefore, λT rigger can also be written as

P ∗ )T .

It is worthy of note that the probability of hitting the trigger given as (19) is
modelled using the Black–Scholes setting as used in Section 4.1.

4.3 CoCo Modelling using Equity Derivatives
The equity derivatives model used in this paper is based on GBM using Black–Scholes
assumption in order to obtain a closed form solution6 . De Spiegeleer et al. (2014)
present the final payoff of a CoCo into the bond’s face value and a component that
occurs based on an actual trigger during a bond’s life. In the equity derivatives
approach, the CoCo is priced by solving for a portfolio that replicates the CoCo’s
cashflow. It is based on the assumption that a CoCo can be broken down into a
bond part and another part consisting of a derivative contract on the stock of the
CoCo issuer.

Let D be the Face value of CoCo, N is the Number of shares to CoCo holders
at conversion and KIF traders are left with the residual value of their stocks
discounted at q as the cost of carry. To price CoCo using the equity derivatives
approach, we consider the cash flow of a portfolio consisting of a long position
in Bond and a long position in N KIFs that replicate the cash flow of the CoCo.
Therefore, to price a CoCo using a closed-formula, a zero-Coupon CoCo is the sum
of Zero-Coupon Corporate Bond (B) and Knock-In Forwards(KIFs):
CoCot = value(B + KIF s)t
6

(20)

A closed form solution is an expression for an exact solution given with a finite amount
of data. A solution is in closed-form if we can solve a given problem in terms of functions
and mathematical operations from a given generally-accepted set.
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Equation (20) can therefore be written as
CoCot = e−r(T −t) D + KIFt

(20a)

The Zero-Coupon Corporate Bond part of Equation (20a), e−r(T −t) D, is computed
using the risk free rate, r, for time period T − t.
On the other hand, the price of a KIF is the sum of a short exposure in a knock-in7
put (KIP ) and a long exposure in a knock-in call (KIC):
KIFT = KICT − KIPT

(21)

Let S, σ, φ(x) and µ be parameters described in Section 4.3. Both KIC and KIP
share the same strike Pc and barrier prices S ∗ . KIC and KIP are given as
KICt = St e−q(T −t)

−Pc e−r(T −t)

KIPt = Pc e

−r(T −t)

φ −



log



s∗
st
s∗
s

s∗
st

2
)
 2(r−q−0.5σ
2
σ

φ

2
)
 2(r−q−0.5σ
2
σ



φ

+ µ (T − t)

s∗
s

log



− µ (T − t)

σ (T − t)(0.5)

log

s∗
s



+ µ (T − t)

(0.5)

− St e

!

σ (T − t)(0.5)

!

σ (T − t)

!

−q(T −t)

φ −

log

s∗
s



− µ (T − t)

σ (T − t)

!

(0.5)

(22)

Consequently, the CoCo price, as given in Equations (20) and (20a), is:
CoCot = e−r(T −t) D + N ∗ (KICt − KIPt )

(23)

The similarity between the equity and credit derivatives approaches is that
they are based on a single stochastic process that solves for both the trigger
7

A knock-in is a type of option contract that only becomes an option when a specified
price (barrier) is encountered. Therefore, if the price is never reached, the contract will
then not exist. Knock-ins are a type of barrier option while barrier option is a type of
contract in which the payoff depends on the underlying security’s price and whether it hits
a certain price within a specified period. Barrier options usually have cheaper premiums
than traditional vanilla options, because the barrier increases the probability of the option
expiring worthless. There are two types of knock-in options: down-and-in and up-and-in.
In the former, the option is activated only if the underlying security’s price falls below
a certain level. The latter type of option is activated only after an underlying security’s
price rises to a certain level. Call option gives you the right to buy while sell gives the
right to sell the underlying security.
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and the share price. The assumptions about the trigger contingency is the
distinction between the two derivatives approaches as well as the structural
approach. However, they do not use accounting trigger but rather marketbased one. The structural Merton (1974) model uses the market value of
assets that can depend on the accounting trigger.
4.4 Selecting the appropriate CoCo pricing approach
A major feature of the three pricing methods is the use of Black–Scholes assumption based on Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) that log returns on
assets are independent and identically normally distributed as well as volatility being constant. These assumptions have been proven to be empirically
incorrect given the presence of fat-tails in finance data, volatility clustering
and long-term correlated returns as well as the presence of jumps in the prices
of some assets. Despite these deficiencies, the Black-Scholes framework has
the benefit of enabling analytically closed-form expressions for the model in
question. Levy process, instead of GBM, has been suggested to be better
models for describing asset or stock price dynamics.
As described in section 4.2, the credit derivatives method is a straightforward
approach and very simplistic. The credit derivatives approach is motivated
by bonds’ features and is priced based on this focus, while neglecting the
underlying stock as the major driver of CoCo valuation. Obviously, this is
a major limitation. Also, in the credit derivative approach implemented,
we calibrated the conversion intensity λ as a deterministic function of time,
instead of considering it to be stochastic, λt which can be done by incorporating jumps in the model. The assumption of constant conversion intensity
variable is for ease and practicality of implementation.
Recall that in the equity derivatives method, the CoCo is divided into bond,
forward and options instruments and therefore its cash flows are considered
to be more realistic than other methods. Consequently, the CoCo structuring process can be replicated, and the instrument’s payoff estimated and
investigated. It should be noted that replicating the equity part of the equity derivative model using knock-in forwards8 may not necessarily result
in perfect replicates. That is because CoCos, usually subscribed by large
institutional investors, can hold a substantial portion of equity share after
conversion and then be able to exercise control of the company. The equity
8

Knock-In Forwards allows the holder whereby to benefit from favourable moves in
spot price up to a predetermined limit. If the knock-in barrier is activated, the holder
will have to progress with the trade at the strike price. Otherwise, the holder can avail of
advantageous move in the spot up to a limit.
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derivatives method is therefore a better option than the credit derivatives for
pricing CoCos.
The structural credit risk model shares all the flaws of the Black-Scholes
approach. However, it has had more theoretical and empirical applications
and as reviewed in the literature, the shortcomings of constant volatility and
fat-tails have been resolved through the use of stochastic volatility models
and price processes that incorporate jumps.
As earlier reviewed, Wilkens and Bethke (2014) show that the 3 pricing approaches were found to be ideal for CoCo bond prices but that the equity
derivatives model is the most appropriate for structuring CoCos, was the
worst performing model in assessment of model fit but it accomplishes the
best performance in their hedge assessment. Also, Erismann (2015) report
that the credit derivative model has the least while, the equity derivative
model the highest, whereas the structural model reported the least pricing
errors and therefore preferred.
The structural Merton model views a bank’s liabilities as contingent claims
issued against its underlying assets. By obtaining the asset values and asset
volatilities from publicly available quoted stock prices and balance sheet information, the structural model produces instantaneous updates of a firm’s
default probability. Furthermore, the Distance to default (DD), a measure
calculated from Merton’s model has been used to monitor risks of financial
institutions by international organizations and financial authorities such as
the European Central Bank. The DD is an important forward-looking indicator that can provide early signs of bank fragility. We therefore, recommend
the structural approach as the preferred model for CoCo pricing.
5.0 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Data Description
The study uses data of the three bridge-banks established by the NDIC after
the 2009 banking crisis for the subsequent transfer of assets and liabilities of
the three insolvent banks (NDIC, 2013).
Prior to the establishment of the bridge-banks, Bank1, Bank2 and Bank3
banks were trading at the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE). The daily stock
price and market capitalisation of the banks covering the period from 2008
to 2009 were obtained from the NSE and used for the study.
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The Treasury bill rate was 3.88 in January 2009, 2.00 in February 2009, 2.53
in March 2009, 3.32 in June 2009 and 4.80 in August and September 20099 .
Treasury bill rate was obtained from the CBN statistical database and used
as the risk-free rate.
Katata and Nwaigwe (2016) estimated recapitalisation required for Bank1,
Bank2 and Bank3 banks as N115.04 billion, N80.74 billion and N183.00 billion, respectively. These figures are used as the face values of the CoCos.
Recall that CoCos are bonds that by design transform into equity after a
pre-set trigger is hit. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN, 2011),
any bank that has a Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of less than 10%, as
the approved minimum CAR, but more than 5% in any month is undercapitalised. The trigger in this case is Regulatory and is activated when the
CAR is less than 5% or when the share price is less than half of its value
on the specified dates as follows. Bank2’s share price was N5.59 for most of
2008 and 2009 but N2.78 on 13th October, 2009 and has estimated volatility
of 13.73% obtained using data from 2nd January 2008 to 12th October, 2009.
Bank3’s share price estimated volatility was estimated to be 58.33% based
on daily data from 2nd June 2008 to 20th July 2009. For Bank1, its share
price was N9.13 as at 1st February, 2009 but descended to N4.49 on 9th July,
2009 with 65.51% as estimated volatility.
The parameters used for pricing the CoCos to be issued by the three banks
are presented in Table 2.
One of the major uncertainties that is required to price the models is volatility. Table 2 shows that the stock price of Bank1was the most volatile during
the 2009 banking crisis, closely followed by Bank2 but Bank3 had very low
stock price volatility because the share price was fixed or constant for a long
period of time.

9

https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/mnymktind.asp?year=2009&month=8
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Table 2: Parameters for the CoCos to be Issued by the Three Banks

5.2 Empirical Results
The aim of this section is to design CoCos for Bank1, Bank2 and Bank3 by
selecting the conversion rate, the yield and other necessary variables of the
CoCo without recourse to public funds. In this paper, simple data analyses
are carried out using Excel, while the main estimations and simulations are
performed with Matlab package.
5.2.1 CoCo Pricing Using Structural Models
The first important step in CoCo pricing is to decide what the trigger is,
which has been reported in Table 2 together with other parameters. Based
on the parameters in the previous section, using total deposits as liabilities,
Table 3 presents the parameters estimated using Merton (1974) Structural
Model as described in Section 4.1 and equations (1) to (12).
Table 3: Result of CoCo pricing using Structural Model

As observed in Table 2 with its stock price being the most volatile during the
2009 banking crisis, Bank1 presented the shortest Distance-to-Default as well
as having the highest Probability-of-Default therefore the riskiest bank. Consequently, the CoCo yield of Bank1 is the highest out of the three banks with
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corresponding highest credit spread. Bank3 closely follows Bank1 with the
second highest Distance-to-Default and corresponding Probability-of-Default
as the next risky bank. Bank2 produced the lowest yield and reported that
there is no need for credit spread if CoCo is to be issued.
Note that when the implied credit spread is added to the continuous interest
rate, we obtain the total yield of the CoCo that the bank will issue.
5.2.2 CoCo Pricing using Credit and Equity derivatives
Based on the parameters presented in Table 2, Table 4 presents the variables of interest required for issuing CoCo by the three banks using credit
(described in Section 4.2, equations 13-19) and equity derivatives approaches
(described in Section 4.3).
Table 4: Result of CoCo pricing using Credit and Equity derivatives

Like the result obtained from the structural model, the credit derivatives
approach reported the highest credit spread to be by the CoCo of Bank1,
then Bank3 and Bank2 has the least but non-zero value. Equity derivatives
approach however priced the highest spread and yield to CoCo of Bank3 followed by Bank1 with Bank2 having the lowest non-zero spread.
The credit spread expected from Bank2 is the lowest from the three approaches. For Bank3, the Equity Derivatives approach reported lower credit
spread than the Structural Model which also reported lower values than obtained from the Credit Derivatives approach. For Bank1, the highest credit
spread was estimated by the Structural Model followed by Credit Derivatives
approach with the Equity Derivatives method giving the lowest estimate.
The paper supports the findings of Wilkens and Bethke (2014) that the equity derivatives model is the most appropriate for structuring CoCos due to
its simplistic parameterisation and interpretation. However, model accuracy
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and other germane issues may be overlooked. The study also supports the
findings of the Krishnan and Jacoby (2012) and Wilkens and Bethke (2014)
as the most appropriate for CoCo pricing by reflecting the most CoCo features but the approach suffers from model complexity.
The two derivative approaches give different prices because there is a difference in what the CoCo holders get for equity and credit derivatives approach
at maturity of the bond. For the former, the holder of the bond is rewarded
with a forward on the stock that matures. In case of the latter, that is the
credit derivatives approach, the holder is rewarded with cash amount, not
forward, that is the same as the number of shares multiplied by trigger price
at maturity.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
This subsection presents the result of the several sensitivity analysis conducted on the variables in the structural approach of CoCo pricing. In the
sensitivity analysis, we vary some of the variables while keeping others constant to understand the framework better according to equations 1-12. It
should be noted that there is some level of uncertainty when dealing with
financial models with respect to the estimated parameters. By changing the
input data in the model, we can better understand the model sensitivity as
a function of the estimated parameters.
The default probability in the Merton model is a nonlinear function (where
the default probability has to be solved iteratively using optimization, in
this paper using Microsoft Excel Non-Linear Solver) of the firm’s stock price,
stock price volatility, and leverage ratio. We investigate how these parameters
affect deposit liabilities of the banks and their equity values. The parameters
whose value change in the sensitivity analysis are the equity volatility, equity
value (market capitalisation) and liabilities.
5.3.1 Analysing Sensitivity to Changing Equity Volatility
In this section, the equity volatility changes while all other parameters are
as estimated and reported in Table 2. As shown in Figure 1 for Bank1,
the higher the equity volatility, the greater the Probability-of-Default (PD),
as expected and the more the likelihood of failure. The relationship seems
to be more linear than the relationship between Equity Volatility and those of
Yield-to-Maturity, Implied-Credit-Spread, Trigger-Intensity and CoCoSpread
that produced slightly convex curves. In all cases, as the Equity Volatility increases, Yield-to-Maturity, Implied-Credit-Spread, Trigger-Intensity and CoCoSpread also increase. The same outcome was observed for Bank2 and
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Bank3 but not shown because of space.

Figure 1: Bank1 Sensitivity Analysis to Equity Volatility
Table 5a also shows the unobervable asset value and asset volatility of Bank1
inferred from the market values using the Merton approach. It can be seen
from the Table that the asset value is stable around N273 to N276 billion
for equity volatility ranging around 35-80% for Bank1. Table 5b also shows
the asset value and asset volatility of Bank3 inferred from the market values
using the Merton approach. It can be seen from the Table that the asset
value is stable around N428 to N431 billion for equity volatility ranging from
45% to 80% for Bank3.
For Bank1, the asset volatility is also steady around 1-2% for the changing equity volatility. However, as the equity volatility increases, the going-concern
condition of the bank continues to be threatened as shown by increasing PD
and decreasing DD. That leads to increasing probability of hitting the trigger
for CoCo conversion.
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Table 5a: Bank1, changing only equity volatility

Table 5b: Bank2, changing only equity volatility

The same outcome was observed for Bank3 but not shown because of space.
5.3.2 Analysing Sensitivity to Changing Market Capitalization
Tables 6a and 6b show the estimated values of interest when all other parameters are held constant but market capitalization of Bank1, Bank3 and
Bank2 (not displayed) banks changes. The table shows that increasing the
market capitalization for Bank1 also increases the asset value inferred from
the Merton model, asset volatility as well as a rise in the DD and lower PD,
corresponding to lower default by the bank. That also resulted in a constant
or static COCO spread, probability of hitting the trigger for CoCo conversion and Trigger Intensity. Therefore, increasing equity market capitalization
increases the going-concern status of Bank1 and decreases both the yield to
maturity and implied credit spread, because the bank is in a better financial
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condition that does not support the need for CoCo conversion of bonds to
equity.
Table 6a: Bank1 with changing market capitalization

Table 6b: Bank3 with changing market capitalization

The same outcome was observed for Bank2 but not shown because of space.
5.3.3 Analysing Sensitivity to Changing Liabilities
Table 7 shows the estimated values of interest when all parameters are held
constant except the banks’ Liabilities that change. The table shows that
increasing the Liabilities of Bank1 (Table 7a) and Bank3 (7b) also increases
the asset value inferred from the Merton model, decreases their asset volatilities and DDs but raises the banks’ PD, corresponding to higher default by
the banks.
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Table 7a: Bank1 with changing Liabilities

Table 7b: Bank3 with changing Liabilities

That also led to a constant or static COCO spread, probability of hitting the
trigger for CoCo conversion and Trigger Intensity. Therefore, increasing Liabilities reduces the going-concern status of the three banks (Bank2 analysis,
though not displayed, but still presented same findings) and increases both
the yields to maturity and implied credit spreads, because the banks are not
in good financial conditions and as the liability increases, more support is
gathered for CoCo conversion of bonds to equity. The same outcome was
observed for Bank2 but not shown because of space.
6.0 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The paper described the features, characteristics and application of CoCos
for bank recapitalisation. CoCos, like bail-in bonds recapitalisation, have the
same objective of making bondholders contribute to the cost of resolving a
failing/failed bank. It should be noted that there is no universally-accepted
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way of designing CoCos. Rather, a decision should always be taken based on
a particular bank’s condition.
This paper also analysed the three CoCo pricing categories: credit derivatives or reduced form, equity derivative approach and structural approach.
The presented pricing approaches are useful for valuing CoCos while their
assessment should broaden and provide insight to investors, bankers and regulators seeking to use them for different objectives. The paper then applied
the three pricing frameworks to the CoCo resolution of three Nigerian banks
that were initially resolved using the bridge-bank mechanism that relied on
very costly bail-out using public funds. It was found that similar to the result
obtained from the structural model, the credit derivatives approach reported
the highest credit spread to be by the CoCo of Bank1, followed by CoCo
of Bank3 and Bank2 with the least but non-zero value. Equity derivatives
approach however, priced the highest spread and yield to CoCo of Bank3
followed by Bank1 with Bank2 also, having the lowest non-zero spread. The
study showed that the credit derivatives and equity derivatives approaches
as well as the structural model of Merton all produced different values for the
parameters required to issue CoCo bonds. That can be explained because
of the differences in the assumptions and other mechanics of the models but
the three CoCo pricing frameworks arguably explain the economics of CoCos
appropriately.
Out of the three CoCo pricing approaches, the structural Merton model was
selected as the most appropriate for structuring CoCos. That is because, this
approach reported the least pricing errors by other researchers and builds asset values of the banks from publicly-available quoted stock prices as well as
deposit components of bank’s balance sheet information. Furthermore, the
Distance-to-Default, a measure calculated from Merton’s model, has been
used to monitor risks of financial institutions by international organizations
and is an important forward-looking indicator that can provide early signs
of bank fragility.
However, the study is limited to zero-coupon bonds and analysis of issuing
coupon bearing CoCo bonds should be explored using the models implemented in this study as well as several others. Also, the models used did
not consider jumps, stochastic risk free and simulation-based CoCo pricing
techniques that can be considered for future work.
Nigerian banks, especially domestic systemically important ones, should be
encouraged to issue CoCo bonds as a way of bank recapitalisation if the sce149
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nario arises. The regulators should establish and ensure implementation of
appropriate Know-Your-Customer (KYC) by all CoCo investors in Nigeria.
Beyond KYC, the relevant financial sector regulators should be heavily involved in the design of CoCos with financial stability objectives and possibly
incorporate some measure of systemic risk as the trigger for conversion to
equity.
References
Albul, B., Jaffee, D.M. and Tchistyi, A. (2010). Contingent Convertible Bonds
and Capital Structure Decisions, University of California, Berkeley, Working
Paper.
Alessandri, P. and Haldane, A. G. (2011). Banking on the State. In The International Financial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed? 169-195.
Presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Twelfth Annual International Banking Conference.
Allen, L., Boudoukh, J. and Saunders, A. (2009), Understanding market, credit,
and operational risk: the value at risk approach. John Wiley & Sons.
Avdjiev, S., Bogdanova, B., Bolton, P., Jiang, W. and Kartasheva, A. (2017).
CoCo issuance and bank fragility (No. w23999). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Avdjiev, S., Kartasheva, A. and Bogdanova, B. (2013). CoCos: a primer. BIS
Quarterly Review, 43-56.
Bloomberg (2009). How to price an auto-callable note with OVSN. Bloomberg
Technical Report November 2009.
Boermans, M., Petrescu, S. and Vlahu , R. (2014), “The future for CoCos ”,
available from VoxEU.org, 17 November 2014.
Boermans, M. A., and van Wijnbergen, S. (2018). Contingent convertible bonds:
Who invests in European CoCos? Applied Economics Letters, 25(4), 234238.
Bundesbank, Deutsche (2018), Contingent convertible bonds: design, regulation,
usefulness, Monthly Report, 53.
Calomiris, C.W. and Herring, R. J. (2011) Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement. Working paper available from SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815406.

150

CBN Journal of Applied Statistics Vol. 10 No. 1 (June, 2019)

119-153

Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN (2011). Supervisory Intervention Framework for
the Nigerian Banking Industry. Banking Supervision Department and Financial Policy & Regulation Department, CBN.
Chen, N., Glasserman, P., Nouri, B. and Pelger, M. (2013). CoCos, Bail-In, and
Tail Risk. Office of Financial Research Working Paper No. 0004.
De Spiegeleer, J.. and Schoutens, W. (2011a). Pricing contingent convertibles:
A derivatives approach. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1795092.
De Spiegeleer, J.. and Schoutens, W. (2011b). Steering a bank around a death
spiral: Multiple trigger CoCos. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1976985.
De Spiegeleer, J., Schoutens, W. and Van Hulle, C. (2014). The handbook of
hybrid securities: convertible bonds, coco bonds, and bail-in. John Wiley &
Sons.
Duffie, D. and Singleton, K. J. (2003). Credit risk: pricing, measurement, and
management. Princeton University Press.
Erismann, M. (2015). Pricing contingent convertible capital-a theoretical and
empirical analysis of selected pricing models . Doctor of Philosophy Thesis,
University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social
Sciences and International Affairs.
European Banking Authority (2011). Recommendation on the Creation and Supervisory Oversight of Temporary Capital Buffers to Restore Market Confidence. http://www.eba.europa.eu/
Flannery, M. J. (2002) No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline Via ’Reverse Convertible Debentures’. Working paper available from
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.352762.
Flannery, M. J. (2009) Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent
Capital Certificates. Working paper available from SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485689 (accessed August 2017).
Flannery, M. J. (2014). Contingent capital instruments for large financial institutions: A review of the literature. Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ., 6(1),
225-240.
Glasserman, P. and Nouri, B. (2012). Contingent capital with a capital-ratio
trigger. Management Science, 58(10), 1816-1833.
Independent Commission on Banking (2011) Independent Commission on Banking of U.K. Final Report. Recommendations.

151

Assessing Contingent Convertible Bonds for Bank Recapitalization in Nigeria

Katata

Katata, K. and Nwaigwe, O. (2016). Bail-In as an alternative failure resolution
mechanism in Nigeria. NDIC Quarterly, September 2016 Edition.
Krishnan, M., and Jacoby, P. (2012). Bail-in Capital: The New Box. World
Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, International Journal of
Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering, 6(1), 88-92.
Liebenberg, F.J.N., Van Vuuren, G.W. & Heymans, A., (2018), ‘Exploring contingent convertible bond alternatives for African banks’, South African Journal
of Economic and Management Sciences 21(1), a2286.
https://doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v21i1.2286
McDonald, R. (2010) Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger, working
paper, Finance Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern
University.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of
interest rates. The Journal of finance, 29(2), 449-470.
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, NDIC, (2009), 20 Years of Deposit Insurance in Nigeria, Research Department, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, NDIC (2013), Bridge Bank as a Failure
Resolution Option in Nigeria, NDIC.
Nordal, K. B. and Stefano, N. (2014). Contingent convertible bonds (cocos)
issued by european banks, Norges Bank Staff Memos, NR. 19.
Pazarbasioglu, C., Zhou, M. J. P., Le Leslé, V., & Moore, M. (2011). Contingent
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